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Proposed Keystone XL Pipeline: Legal Issues 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] In 2008, TransCanada Corp. applied for a presidential permit from the State Department to 
construct and operate an oil pipeline across the U.S.-Canada border in a project known as Keystone XL. 
The Keystone XL pipeline would transport oil produced from oil sands in Alberta,Canada, to Gulf Coast 
refineries. The permit application was subjected to review by the State Department pursuant to executive 
branch authority over cross-border pipeline facilities as articulated in Executive Order 13337. 
After several phases of review, on November 10, 2011, the State Department announced that it would 
seek additional information about alternative pipeline routes before it could move forward with a national 
interest determination. In response, several pieces of legislation were introduced, including Title V of the 
Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011. Title V dictated that President must grant the 
Keystone XL pipeline permit within 60 days of the law’s enactment, unless the President determined that 
the pipeline is not in the national interest. If the President did not make a national interest determination 
and took no action to grant the permit, then the law provided that the permit “shall be in effect by 
operation of law.” The Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-78), including Title V 
addressing the Keystone XL permit, was enacted on December 23, 2011. 
Pursuant to the requirements of Title V, on January 18, 2012, the State Department recommended that 
“the presidential permit for the proposed Keystone XL pipeline be denied and, that at this time, the 
TransCanada Keystone XL Pipeline be determined not to serve the national interest. ”The same day, the 
President stated his determination that the Keystone XL pipeline project“ would not serve the national 
interest. 
”New legislative activity with respect to the permitting of border-crossing facilities, a subject previously 
handled exclusively by the executive branch, has triggered inquiries as to whether this raises 
constitutional issues related to the jurisdiction of the two branches over such facilities. Additionally, as 
states have begun to contemplate taking action with respect to the pipeline siting, some have questioned 
whether state siting of a pipeline is preempted by federal law. Others argue that states dictating the route 
of the pipeline violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution which, among other things, 
prohibits one state from acting to protect its own interests to the detriment of other states. 
This report reviews those legal issues. First, it suggests that legislation related to cross-border facility 
permitting is unlikely to raise significant constitutional questions, despite the fact that such permits have 
traditionally been handled by the executive branch alone pursuant to its constitutional “foreign affairs” 
authority. Next, it observes generally that state oversight of pipeline siting decisions does not appear to 
violate existing federal law or the Constitution. Finally, the report suggests that State Department’s 
implementation of the existing authority to issue presidential permits appears to allow for judicial review 
of its National Environmental Policy Act determinations. 
Keywords 
Keystone XL pipeline, approval, development, environment, constitutionality, State Department, legality 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Vann, A., Alexander, K., Burrows, V. K., & Thomas, K. R. (2012). Proposed Keystone XL Pipeline: Legal 
issues. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/879 
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress        
 
 
Proposed Keystone XL Pipeline: Legal Issues 
Adam Vann 
Legislative Attorney 
Kristina Alexander 
Legislative Attorney 
Vanessa K. Burrows 
Legislative Attorney 
Kenneth R. Thomas 
Legislative Attorney 
January 23, 2012 
Congressional Research Service 
7-5700 
www.crs.gov 
R42124 
Proposed Keystone XL Pipeline: Legal Issues 
 
Congressional Research Service 
Summary 
In 2008, TransCanada Corp. applied for a presidential permit from the State Department to 
construct and operate an oil pipeline across the U.S.-Canada border in a project known as 
Keystone XL. The Keystone XL pipeline would transport oil produced from oil sands in Alberta, 
Canada, to Gulf Coast refineries. The permit application was subjected to review by the State 
Department pursuant to executive branch authority over cross-border pipeline facilities as 
articulated in Executive Order 13337. 
After several phases of review, on November 10, 2011, the State Department announced that it 
would seek additional information about alternative pipeline routes before it could move forward 
with a national interest determination. In response, several pieces of legislation were introduced, 
including Title V of the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011. Title V dictated 
that President must grant the Keystone XL pipeline permit within 60 days of the law’s enactment, 
unless the President determined that the pipeline is not in the national interest. If the President did 
not make a national interest determination and took no action to grant the permit, then the law 
provided that the permit “shall be in effect by operation of law.” The Temporary Payroll Tax Cut 
Continuation Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-78), including Title V addressing the Keystone XL permit, 
was enacted on December 23, 2011. 
Pursuant to the requirements of Title V, on January 18, 2012, the State Department recommended 
that “the presidential permit for the proposed Keystone XL pipeline be denied and, that at this 
time, the TransCanada Keystone XL Pipeline be determined not to serve the national interest.” 
The same day, the President stated his determination that the Keystone XL pipeline project 
“would not serve the national interest.” 
New legislative activity with respect to the permitting of border-crossing facilities, a subject 
previously handled exclusively by the executive branch, has triggered inquiries as to whether this 
raises constitutional issues related to the jurisdiction of the two branches over such facilities. 
Additionally, as states have begun to contemplate taking action with respect to the pipeline siting, 
some have questioned whether state siting of a pipeline is preempted by federal law. Others argue 
that states dictating the route of the pipeline violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution which, among other things, prohibits one state from acting to protect its own 
interests to the detriment of other states.  
This report reviews those legal issues. First, it suggests that legislation related to cross-border 
facility permitting is unlikely to raise significant constitutional questions, despite the fact that 
such permits have traditionally been handled by the executive branch alone pursuant to its 
constitutional “foreign affairs” authority. Next, it observes generally that state oversight of 
pipeline siting decisions does not appear to violate existing federal law or the Constitution. 
Finally, the report suggests that State Department’s implementation of the existing authority to 
issue presidential permits appears to allow for judicial review of its National Environmental 
Policy Act determinations. 
A companion report from CRS focusing on policy issues associated with the proposal, CRS 
Report R41668, Keystone XL Pipeline Project: Key Issues, by Paul W. Parfomak et al., is also 
available. 
 
Proposed Keystone XL Pipeline: Legal Issues 
 
Congressional Research Service 
Contents 
Background...................................................................................................................................... 1 
Authority to Issue Permits for Border Crossing Facilities: Balancing Executive and 
Legislative Roles .......................................................................................................................... 4 
Source of Presidential Authority to Regulate Foreign Commerce ............................................ 4 
Source of Executive/State Department Permitting Authority.................................................... 4 
Source of Congressional Authority to Regulate Foreign Commerce ........................................ 6 
Reconciling the Executive and Legislative Roles Related to Foreign Commerce and 
Border Crossing Facilities ...................................................................................................... 7 
Executive Branch Deference to Congress on Cross-Border Facilities ................................ 7 
Congressional Action Related to Foreign Commerce ....................................................... 10 
Judicial Interpretations of the Executive and Legislative Authorities to Regulate 
Foreign Commerce......................................................................................................... 10 
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 12 
Constitutional Concerns Related to Potential Action by States ..................................................... 12 
The Dormant Commerce Clause ............................................................................................. 13 
Legal Background ............................................................................................................. 13 
State Authority for Energy Facility Siting......................................................................... 14 
Application of the Dormant Commerce Clause to State Action Related to 
Oil Pipeline Siting.......................................................................................................... 14 
Federal Preemption of State Pipeline Legislation ................................................................... 17 
Background ....................................................................................................................... 17 
How Preemption Is Evaluated........................................................................................... 17 
Conflict Preemption of State Action Related to the 
Proposed Keystone XL Pipeline..................................................................................... 22 
Field Preemption of State Action Related to the Proposed Keystone XL Pipeline ........... 24 
Judicial Review of the NEPA Process for Permitting Under Executive Order 13337................... 24 
Executive Order 13337............................................................................................................ 24 
Keystone XL NEPA Background ............................................................................................ 25 
State Department NEPA Regulations ................................................................................ 25 
Judicial Review ....................................................................................................................... 25 
District Court Holdings Related to Executive Order 13337.............................................. 26 
 
Contacts 
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 29 
 
Proposed Keystone XL Pipeline: Legal Issues 
 
Congressional Research Service 1 
Background 
In September 2008, TransCanada Corp. (a Canadian company) applied to the U.S. Department of 
State for a permit to cross the U.S.-Canada international border with the Keystone XL pipeline 
project.1 If constructed, the pipeline would carry crude oil produced from the oil sands region of 
Alberta, Canada, to U.S. Gulf Coast refineries. The U.S. portion of the Keystone XL pipeline 
project, as proposed, would pass through Montana, South Dakota, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and 
Texas. The pipeline would consist of approximately 1,380 miles of 36-inch-diameter pipe and 
have the capacity to transport 830,000 barrels per day of crude oil to the United States. The 
pipeline would deliver up to roughly 200,000 barrels per day to an existing oil terminal in 
Oklahoma, with the remainder sent further to points in Texas.2 
In most instances, decisions about the siting of oil pipelines, even interstate oil pipelines like the 
proposed Keystone XL pipeline, are made by state governments if the state governments choose 
to exercise a pipeline siting authority.3 The federal government generally does not regulate the 
siting of oil pipelines, although it does oversee oil pipeline safety4 and pricing issues.5 However, 
the construction, connection, operation, and maintenance of a pipeline that connects the United 
States with a foreign country requires the permission of the U.S. Department of State, conveyed 
through a presidential permit.6 Accordingly, the proposed Keystone XL pipeline would require a 
permit. Executive Order 13337 delegates to the Secretary of State the President’s authority to 
issue such a permit upon a determination that the project is in the national interest.7 
Prior to making the national interest determination, the State Department conducts a review under 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).8 For Keystone XL, a draft environmental impact 
statement (EIS) was issued April 16, 2010,9 but the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
found the draft was inadequate.10 A supplemental draft was available in April 2011,11 and again 
                                                 
1 This is an abbreviated discussion of the physical characteristics of the proposed Keystone XL pipeline for the 
purposes of introducing the legal issues related to the pipeline. More information is available at CRS Report R41668, 
Keystone XL Pipeline Project: Key Issues, by Paul W. Parfomak, et al. 
2 U.S. Department of State, Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Keystone XL Oil Pipeline 
Project, p. 1-4 (April 15, 2011).  
3 See, e.g., S.D. Codified Laws §49-41B-4.1 (requiring a state permit and the approval of the state legislature prior to 
construction of a “trans-state” transmission facility, defined to include pipelines). 
4 Pipeline safety is governed by the federal Office of Pipeline Safety, an agency within the Department of 
Transportation, which exercises authority pursuant to the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979, as amended 
(49 U.S.C. §60101 et seq.). 
5 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulates oil pipeline rates pursuant to the authority transferred 
to it by Title XVIII of the National Energy Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-486, 42 U.S.C. §7172 note). 
6 The State Department was delegated authority to issue a permit for cross-boundary pipelines by the President under 
Executive Order 11423 of 1968, as revised in 2004 by Executive Order 13337. 
7 Exec. Order No. 13337, §1(g), Issuance of Permits With Respect to Certain Energy-Related Facilities and Land 
Transportation Crossings on the International Boundaries of the United States, 69 Federal Register 25299 (May 5, 
2004). 
8 42 U.S.C. §§4321 et seq. This report assumes some familiarity with the NEPA process. To learn details about that 
process, see CRS Report RS20621, Overview of National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Requirements, by Kristina 
Alexander, or see the discussion of NEPA in CRS Report R41668, Keystone XL Pipeline Project: Key Issues, by Paul 
W. Parfomak et al. 
9 75 Fed. Reg. 20653 (April 20, 2010). 
10 Letter from Assistant Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, to Assistant Secretary of State, U.S. 
(continued...) 
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EPA found flaws.12 A final EIS was announced in August of that year.13 Under NEPA practice, the 
final EIS would be reviewed by EPA and other interested agencies prior to issuance of a record of 
decision.14 However, a proposed route change through Nebraska put those final actions on hold. 
On November 10, 2011, the State Department announced a decision to seek additional 
information about alternative pipeline routes before it could move forward with a national interest 
determination. Specifically, concerns regarding potential environmental impacts of constructing 
and operating the pipeline along the proposed route through the Sand Hills region of Nebraska led 
the State Department to decide that an assessment of potential alternative routes that would avoid 
that area was necessary.  
On December 23, 2011, Congress passed and the President signed into law the Temporary Payroll 
Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011. Title V of the act addressed the Keystone XL presidential 
permitting process.15 Under that provision, the President was required to grant the Keystone XL 
pipeline permit within 60 days of the law’s enactment, unless the President determined that the 
pipeline was not in the national interest.16 If the President did not make a national interest 
determination and took no action to grant the permit, then the law provided that the permit “shall 
be in effect by operation of law.”17 Title V of the act appears to be the first legislative foray into 
the permitting of the border crossing facilities as contemplated in Executive Orders 11423 and 
13337. 
As required by Title V of the act, on January 18, 2012, the State Department recommended that 
“the presidential permit for the proposed Keystone XL pipeline be denied and, that at this time, 
the TransCanada Keystone XL Pipeline be determined not to serve the national interest.”18 The 
State Department asserted that its recommendation “was predicated on the fact that the 
Department does not have sufficient time to obtain the information necessary to assess whether 
the project, in its current state, is in the national interest.”19 The State Department press release 
also indicated that the 60-day time period provided for the in the act “is insufficient” for a 
determination as to whether the pipeline is in the national interest.20 The State Department said 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
Department of State (July 16, 2010) (“we think that the Draft EIS does not provide the scope or detail of analysis 
necessary to fully inform decision makers and the public, and recommend that additional information and analysis be 
provided”), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/oeca/webeis.nsf/%28PDFView%29/20100126/$file/20100126.PDF. 
11 76 Fed. Reg. 22744 (April 22, 2011). 
12 Letter from Assistant Administrator, EPA, to Assistant Secretaries of State, State Department (June 6, 2011) 
(“additional analysis is necessary... [including] improv[ing] the analysis of oil spill risks and alternative pipeline 
routes”), available at http://environblog.jenner.com/files/here-6.pdf. 
13 76 Fed. Reg. 53525 (August 26, 2011). 
14 40 C.F.R §1502.19 (circulation of EIS); 40 C.F.R §1505.2 (record of decision). 
15 P.L. 112-78. 
16 P.L. 112-78, § 501. 
17 P.L. 112-78, § 501(b)(3). 
18 Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on the Keystone XL 
Pipeline (January 18, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/18/statement-president-keystone-xl-
pipeline; Media Note, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Denial of Keystone XL Pipeline 
Application (January 18, 2012), http://www.cq.com/pdf/govdoc-4012555. 
19 Media Note, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Denial of Keystone XL Pipeline Application 
(January 18, 2012), http://www.cq.com/pdf/govdoc-4012555. 
20 Id. 
Proposed Keystone XL Pipeline: Legal Issues 
 
Congressional Research Service 3 
that “subsequent permit applications” and “applications for similar projects” were not precluded 
by the denial of this particular permit application.21 The same day, the President stated his 
determination that the Keystone XL pipeline project “would not serve the national interest.”22 He 
made this determination, as required by Title V of the act, in a memorandum to the Secretary of 
State.23 
In addition to Title V of the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011, several other 
pieces of legislation have been introduced in Congress to compel expedited review of the 
Keystone XL application. The North American Energy Security Act (S. 1932), the American 
Energy Security Act (H.R. 3537), and the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2011 
(H.R. 3630) also would require the Secretary of State to issue a permit for the project within 60 
days of enactment, unless the President publicly determines the project to be not in the national 
interest. The January 18, 2012, determination that the project was not in the national interest may 
have superseded this proposed legislation. The North American Energy Access Act (H.R. 3548) 
would transfer permitting authority over the Keystone XL pipeline project from the State 
Department to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and would require the 
commission to issue a permit for the project within 30 days of enactment. Also, other legislation 
may be introduced in the near future in response to the January 18, 2012, national interest 
determinations of the Secretary of State and the President. 
The recent legislative activity appears to represent the first congressional efforts to amend the 
established executive branch procedure for the permitting of cross-border pipeline facilities, and 
there is some question as to whether this raises constitutional issues related to the jurisdiction of 
the two branches over such facilities. Additionally, as states consider taking action with respect to 
the pipeline siting, some have questioned whether state siting of a pipeline is preempted by 
federal law. Others have argued that states dictating the route of the pipeline violates the dormant 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution, which prohibits one state from acting to protect its own 
interests to the detriment of other states. Finally, some environmental groups have raised 
questions about the adequacy of government review of the proposed pipeline under the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the routing of the pipeline near key aquifers, and the 
emissions caused by the oil production. This report reviews those legal issues, observing 
generally that legislation altering the pipeline border crossing approval process appears likely to 
be a legitimate exercise of Congress’s constitutional authority to regulate foreign commerce and 
that state oversight of pipeline siting decisions does not appear to violate existing federal law or 
the Constitution. The report also suggests that the State Department’s implementation of its 
authority to issue presidential permits appears to allow for judicial review of its NEPA 
determinations. A companion report from CRS focusing on policy issues associated with the 
proposal, CRS Report R41668, Keystone XL Pipeline Project: Key Issues, by Paul W. Parfomak 
et al., is also available. 
                                                 
21 Id. 
22 Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Secretary of State on Implementing Provisions of the Temporary 
Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011 Relating to the Keystone XL Pipeline Permit, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2012/01/18/presidential-memorandum-implementing-provisions-temporary-payroll-tax-cu. 
23 Id. 
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Authority to Issue Permits for Border Crossing 
Facilities: Balancing Executive and Legislative Roles 
Source of Presidential Authority to Regulate Foreign Commerce 
The Constitution does not expressly accord the President any authority to regulate foreign 
commerce. However, the President’s recognized authority in the area of foreign affairs permits 
him to take action in matters of foreign commerce such as border crossing facilities, as discussed 
below. There has been some judicial recognition of the President’s ability to exercise authority 
over matters implicating foreign commerce, even in the absence of an express delegation of 
authority by Congress,24 but the Supreme Court has not definitively opined on the circumstances 
in which any such authority may be exercised. 
Source of Executive/State Department Permitting Authority 
The executive branch exercises permitting authority over the construction and operation of 
“pipelines, conveyor belts, and similar facilities for the exportation or importation of petroleum, 
petroleum products” and other products pursuant to a series of executive orders. This authority 
has been vested in the U.S. State Department since the promulgation of Executive Order 11423 in 
1968.25 Executive Order 13337 amended this authority and the procedures associated with the 
review, but did not substantially alter the exercise of authority or the delegation to the Secretary 
of State in Executive Order 11423.26  
Executive Order 11423 provided that, except with respect to cross-border permits for electric 
energy facilities, natural gas facilities, and submarine facilities, 
The Secretary of State is hereby designated and empowered to receive all applications for 
permits for the construction, connection, operation, or maintenance, at the borders of the 
United States, of: (i) pipelines, conveyor belts, and similar facilities for the exportation or 
importation of petroleum, petroleum products, coal, minerals, or other products to or from a 
foreign country; (ii) facilities for the exportation or importation of water or sewage to or 
from a foreign country; (iii) monorails, aerial cable cars, aerial tramways and similar 
facilities for the transportation of persons or things, or both, to or from a foreign country; and 
(iv) bridges, to the extent that congressional authorization is not required.27 
                                                 
24 See United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), affirmed on other grounds by 348 U.S. 296 
(1955) (“We think that whatever the power of the executive with respect to making executive trade agreements 
regulating foreign commerce in the absence of action by Congress, it is clear that the executive may not through 
entering into such an agreement avoid complying with a regulation prescribed by Congress. Imports from a foreign 
country are foreign commerce subject to regulation, so far as this country is concerned, by Congress alone.”).  
25 Exec. Order No. 11423, Providing for the performance of certain functions heretofore performed by the President 
with respect to certain facilities constructed and maintained on the borders of the United States, 33 Fed. Reg. 11741 
(August 16, 1968). 
26 Exec. Order No.13337, Issuance of Permits With Respect to Certain Energy-Related Facilities and Land 
Transportation Crossings on the International Boundaries of the United States, 69 Fed. Reg. 25299 (May 5, 2004). 
27 Exec. Order No. 11423, 33 Fed. Reg. at 11741. 
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Executive Order 13337 designates and empowers the Secretary of State to “receive all 
applications for Presidential permits, as referred to in Executive Order 11423, as amended, for the 
construction, connection, operation, or maintenance, at the borders of the United States, of 
facilities for the exportation or importation of petroleum, petroleum products, coal, or other fuels 
to or from a foreign country.”28 Executive Order 13337 further provides that after consideration of 
the application and comments received thereon: “[I]f the Secretary of State finds that issuance of 
a permit to the applicant would serve the national interest, the Secretary shall prepare a permit, in 
such form and with such terms and conditions as the national interest may in the Secretary’s 
judgment require, and shall notify the officials required to be consulted ... that a permit be 
issued.”29 Thus, the Secretary of State is directed by the President to authorize all border crossing 
facilities that the Secretary has determined would “serve the national interest.”  
However, the source of the executive branch’s permitting authority is not explicitly stated within 
the executive orders. Powers exercised by the executive branch are authorized by legislation or 
are inherent presidential powers based in the Constitution. Executive Order 11423 does not 
reference any statute or constitutional provision as the source of its authority, although it does 
state that “the proper conduct of foreign relations of the United States requires that executive 
permission be obtained for the construction and maintenance” of border crossing facilities.30 
Executive Order 13337 refers only to the “Constitution and the Laws of the United States of 
America, including Section 301 of title 3, United States Code.”31 However, 3 U.S.C. Section 301 
simply provides that the President is empowered to delegate authority to the head of any 
department or agency of the executive branch.  
Federal courts have addressed the legitimacy of this permitting authority. In Sisseton-Wahpeton 
Oyate v. U.S. Department of State, the plaintiff Tribes asked the court to suspend or revoke a 
presidential permit issued under Executive Order 13337 for the TransCanada Keystone Pipeline.32 
The plaintiffs claimed that the issuance of the national interest determination and the border 
crossing permit for the project violated NEPA and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The 
U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota determined that even if the plaintiffs’ injury 
could be redressed, “the President would be free to disregard the court’s judgment,” as the case 
concerned the President’s “inherent constitutional authority to conduct foreign policy,” as 
opposed to statutory authority granted to the President by Congress.33 The court further found that 
even if the Tribes had standing, the issuance of the presidential permit was a presidential action, 
not an agency action subject to judicial review under APA.34  
The court stated that the authority to regulate the cross-border pipeline lies with either Congress 
or the President.35 The court found that “Congress has failed to create a federal regulatory scheme 
for the construction of oil pipelines, and has delegated this authority to the states. Therefore, the 
                                                 
28 Exec. Order No. 13337, 69 Fed. Reg. at 25299. 
29 Id. at 25230. 
30 33 Fed. Reg. at 11741. 
31 69 Fed. Reg. at 25299. 
32 659 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1078 (D.S.D. 2009). This Keystone pipeline project preceded the Keystone XL pipeline.  
33 Id. at 1078, 1078 n.5. 
34 Id. at 1081-82. 
35 Id. at 1081. 
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President has the sole authority to allow oil pipeline border crossings under his inherent 
constitutional authority to conduct foreign affairs.”36 
In Sierra Club v. Clinton,37 the plaintiff Sierra Club challenged the Secretary of State’s 2009 
decision to issue a permit authorizing a pipeline from Alberta, Canada, to Superior, Wisconsin. 
The plaintiff claimed that issuance of the permit was unconstitutional because the President had 
no authority to issue the permits referenced in Executive Order 13337.38 The defendant responded 
that the authority to issue permits for these border-crossing facilities “does not derive from a 
delegation of congressional authority ... but rather from the President’s constitutional authority 
over foreign affairs and his authority as Commander in Chief.”39 The U.S. District Court for the 
District of Minnesota agreed, noting that the defendant’s assertion regarding the source of the 
President’s authority has been “well recognized” in a series of Attorney General opinions, as well 
as a 2009 judicial opinion.40 The court also noted that these permits had been issued many times 
before and that “Congress has not attempted to exercise any exclusive authority over the 
permitting process. Congress’s inaction suggests that Congress has accepted the authority of the 
President to issue cross-border permits.”41 Based on the historical recognition of the President’s 
authority to issue those permits and Congress’s implied approval through inaction, the court 
found the permit requirement for border facilities constitutional. 
As these cases show, courts that have analyzed the President’s exercise of permitting authority as 
articulated in Executive Order 13337 have held that it is a legitimate exercise of the President’s 
constitutional authority, and therefore does not require legislative authorization. 
Source of Congressional Authority to Regulate Foreign Commerce 
 
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution authorizes Congress to “regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations.” Whereas any independent presidential authority in matters affecting foreign commerce 
derives from the President’s more general foreign affairs authority, Congress’s power over foreign 
commerce is plainly enumerated by the Constitution, suggesting that its authority in this field is 
preeminent. In a review of the origins of the Constitution’s Foreign Commerce Clause, the former 
Special Counsel of the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel emphasized the 
placement of the foreign commerce power with Congress, stating that 
the power to regulate foreign commerce at the national level was to be vested in Congress. 
… The debate at the Philadelphia Convention over whether a bare majority or a 
supermajority of each House was required to enact foreign commerce regulations 
demonstrates that the Framers intended such regulation to be made by a legislative body, 
rather than an executive or judicial one.42 
                                                 
36 Id.  
37 689 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (D. Minn. 2010). 
38 Id. at 1162. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 1163 (citing 38 U.S. Att’y Gen. 163 (1935); 30 U.S. Op. Att’y Gen. 217 (1913); 24 U.S. Op. Att’y Gen. 100 
(1902); 22 Op. Att’y Gen. 408 (1899); and Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) v. U.S. Department of State, 
658 F. Supp. 2d 105, 109 (D.D.C. 2009)).  
41 Id. 
42 Robert J. Delahunt, Federalism Beyond the Water’s Edge: State Procurement Sanctions and Foreign Affairs, 37 
(continued...) 
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Reconciling the Executive and Legislative Roles Related to 
Foreign Commerce and Border Crossing Facilities 
Each of the three branches of the federal government has opined on the nature of the executive 
and legislative powers related to matters related to foreign affairs and foreign commerce, in many 
cases addressing border crossing facilities specifically.  
Executive Branch Deference to Congress on Cross-Border Facilities 
Until recently, Presidents have indicated that executive permission for cables, pipelines, and other 
border crossing facilities may be granted or refused only to the extent that Congress has not acted 
to institute terms and conditions on such facilities. For example, in 1869, President Grant resisted 
the landing of a transatlantic cable from France for which the French government had granted a 
monopoly.43 President Grant recounted his unwillingness to act “[i]n the absence of legislation by 
Congress,” but stated that he dropped his resistance to the cable once the monopolistic condition 
was removed.44 Letters indicate that he understood that Congress could impose “limitations and 
conditions” upon the laying of cables within U.S. waters.45 He then proposed legislation to 
Congress with conditions “for the protection of the public” from monopolies with the right to 
operate cable telegrams.46 He also indicated that “unless Congress otherwise direct[ed],” he 
would not oppose the landing of any other cable that complied with the conditions he had 
outlined and presented to Congress.  
As another example, in 1897, President McKinley declined to act on request for an application 
from a French company to the State Department, requesting permission to land a supplementary 
cable under the “same terms and conditions as those which were imposed by the President in 
1879 when the original cable was landed.”47 The State Department’s letter to the French 
Ambassador stated that the President did “not regard himself as clothed, in the absence of 
legislative enactment, with the requisite authority to take any action upon the application.”48 
President McKinley’s position stemmed from the congressional introduction of a bill to grant the 
President “express authority to authorize the landing of submarine cable … subject to conditions 
therein specified,” which “failed to become law.”49 
A series of Attorney General opinions dating back to the 19th century also suggest that the 
executive branch has taken an expansive view of Congress’s authority in the area of cross-border 
commercial activity. These Attorney General opinions conditioned the President’s authority to 
prohibit or permit cross-border cables, telegraphs, and electrical power on the absence of 
congressional action. The Department of Justice has cited these Attorney General opinions as 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 25 (2001). 
4322 Op. Att’y Gen. 13 (1898). 
44 Id. (citing Senate Doc. 122, at 70). 
45 Id. (citing Senate Doc. 122, at 70). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. (reciting from a May 11, 1897 letter from the State Department). 
49 Id. (reciting from a May 11, 1897 letter from the State Department). 
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“indicat[ing] that the President or his delegates for over a century have exercised the inherent 
executive authority to issue such permits without action by Congress.”50 These opinions assert 
that the President may permit or prohibit the landing of a foreign cable, subject to legislation by 
Congress; recognize that cross-border cables are “instrument[s] of commerce”; and indicate that 
the President’s power to act in the absence of legislation on point derives from his “power to 
prohibit [the landing of a foreign cable] should he deem it an encroachment on our rights or 
prejudicial to our interests.”51  
The first of these Attorney General opinions, dating to 1898, formed the basis for future Attorney 
General opinions on submarine cables, wireless telegraphy, and gas pipelines. The Solicitor 
General, acting as the Attorney General, addressed the Secretary of State’s questions as to “the 
power of the President, in the absence of legislative enactment, to control the landing of foreign 
telegraphic cables.”52 The acting Attorney General reviewed presidential actions and related 
communications regarding the landing of submarine cables dating back to the landing of the first 
foreign cable from Cuba to Florida in 1867.53 The first cable to the United States landed “under 
the supposed authority” of a 1866 congressional act granting a monopoly to one company, but 
reserving to Congress “the power to alter and determine the rates.”54 However, Congress had not 
always enacted legislation imposing terms and conditions on subsequent cables that came to the 
shores of the United States. Presidents in the latter half of the 19th century granted permission for 
the landing of several cables, while indicating that the executive branch’s permission in such 
matters was “subject to future action by Congress.”55 
In this 1898 opinion, the Attorney General stated that the President was charged with the 
“preservation of our territorial integrity and the protection of our foreign interests.”56 The 
Attorney General found that the President’s ability to act was not limited to enforcing particular 
congressional acts, but that he was under oath to “preserve, protect, and defend the 
Constitution.”57 The opinion relied on the President’s position as “head of the diplomatic service” 
and Commander-in-Chief to find that the President could impose conditions upon foreign cables, 
in absence of congressional legislation, and either prevent or permit the landing of such cables 
“on conditions which will protect the interests of this Government and its citizens.”58 
Subsequent Attorney General opinions reached a similar conclusion. For example, 19th century 
legislation directed that the United States not direct any “franchises, or concessions of any kind 
whatever” in Cuba while the United States occupied the island.59 In an 1899 opinion, the Attorney 
General indicated that the executive branch had regulated the matter of cables, “revocable either 
                                                 
50 Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, at 12 (October 20, 
2008), Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Department of State, 658 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D.D.C. 
2009) (No. 08-CV-01363). 
51 Foreign Cables, 22 Op. Att’y Gen. 13 (January 18, 1898). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. (citing Forty-ninth Congress, second session, Senate Doc. 122, at 63). 
55 Id. (citing Senate Doc. 122, at 76). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Cuba-Cables, 22 Op. Att’y Gen. 408 (1899). 
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at the will of the President or by subsequent legislation by Congress.”60 The general in charge of 
U.S. forces in Cuba had forbidden “grants and concessions of franchises” in Cuba, unless the 
Secretary of War approved.61 Although the Attorney General did not “concede that Congress, by 
legislative act, has the power to restrain or control the proper exercise of the powers of the 
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, occupying, … a foreign 
territory,” the Attorney General found that the expressed congressional will conformed to the 
executive branch’s previous policies and was “entitled to the respect of the Executive 
Departments, and ought to be followed.”62 The Attorney General thus advised the Secretary of 
War “that it would be inexpedient … to grant permission to the applicant in this case to land its 
cable upon the soil of Cuba.”63 
Similarly, a 1913 Attorney General opinion interpreting a 1910 treaty between the United States 
and Great Britain concerning the diversion of water from the Niagara River for power purposes, 
as well as a statute on a similar subject, suggests that both the President and Congress have 
authority to regulate such international commercial transactions.64 The opinion found that it was 
the President’s “duty to interfere with any diversion within the State of New York of the waters of 
the Niagara River … for power purposes, exceeding a daily maximum” established in the treaty.65 
The Attorney General said that the treaty’s stipulation that “the United States may authorize and 
permit” the diversion of waters up to a daily maximum “clearly places the subject, in the absence 
of legislation by Congress to the contrary, under [the President’s] supervision.”66 
The opinion also responded to the President’s question as to whether he had “any authority to 
control the importation into [the United States] from Canada of electric current generated by 
water power from the Niagara River.”67 The Attorney General opined that, due to the lapse of a 
statute regarding electricity transmission from Canada, the President was “free to control the 
matter under [his] plenary power to prevent any physical connection (not authorized by Congress) 
between any foreign country and the United States.”68 The opinion recognized the executive 
branch’s power as being “subject, of course, to affirmative control by Congress” to prohibit or 
permit the importation of electrical power into the United States from Canada.69 The Attorney 
General also concluded that “in the absence of legislation by Congress,” the President could 
subject the importation of Canadian electrical power “to such conditions as to [him] may seem 
good.”70 
Finally, it should be noted that Executive Order 11423, discussed earlier in this report, delegated 
authority to the Secretary of State to receive all applications for permits for cross border facilities 
including pipelines, cable cars, bridges, and similar facilities only “to the extent that 
                                                 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Diversion of Water from Niagara River, 30 Op. Att’y Gen. 217 (1913). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
Proposed Keystone XL Pipeline: Legal Issues 
 
Congressional Research Service 10 
congressional authorization is not required.”71 However, Executive Order 13337 omitted the 
qualification “to the extent that congressional authorization is not required,” when amending the 
section in Executive Order 11423 that empowered the Secretary to receive all such applications.72 
Congressional Action Related to Foreign Commerce 
A history of legislation related to border crossing facilities further suggests that congressional 
action related to permitting of pipeline border crossings is a legitimate exercise of Congress’s 
authority to regulate foreign commerce. Examples of congressional legislation “regarding certain 
types of border crossing facilities,” include the Submarine Cable Landing Licensing Act of 1921 
and the International Bridge Act of 1972.73 Additionally, Congress has passed several statutes 
relating specifically to petroleum or pipelines, and some of these require the President to make 
particular findings, such as that certain exports are in the national interest: the Export 
Administration Act of 1979,74 the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920,75 the Naval Petroleum Reserve 
Production Act of 1976,76 the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978,77 the 
Energy Policy and Conservation Act,78 and the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986.79  
Judicial Interpretations of the Executive and Legislative Authorities to 
Regulate Foreign Commerce 
The Supreme Court’s pronouncements on the foreign commerce clause recognize the expansive 
scope of this enumerated congressional power.80 The Court has said that this power is “exclusive 
                                                 
71 Exec. Order No. 11423, 33 Fed. Reg. 11741 (August 16, 1968).  
72 See Exec. Order No. 13337, § 2(a), 69 Fed. Reg. 25299, 25300-01 (May 5, 2004). 
73 P.L. 67-8; P.L. 92-434. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended 
Complaint, at 13 n.5 (October 20, 2008), Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Department of 
State, 658 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 08-CV-01363).  
74 P.L. 96-72. This act prohibited the export from the United States or any of its territories or possessions of 
domestically produced crude oil transported by pipeline over rights-of-way granted under the Trans-Alaska Pipeline 
Authorization Act, P.L. 93-153. 
75 P.L. 66-146. This act restricted the export of crude oil transported by pipelines on federal lands, with an exemption 
for certain crude oil. This act allowed the export of unexempted oil provided the President made certain findings, 
recommended the export, and reported to Congress, and Congress enacted a joint resolution approving such export. 
76 P.L. 94-258. This act provided that before certain exports of petroleum could occur, the President must make, 
publish, and report to Congress the express finding that they will not diminish the total quantity or quality of petroleum 
available to the United States, are in the national interest, and are in accord with the Export Administration Act.  
77 P.L. 95-372. This act provided that before certain oil could be exported, the President must make and publish an 
express finding that the exports will not increase reliance on imported oil, are in the national interest, and are in accord 
with the Export Administration Act. 
78 P.L. 94-163. This act required the President to issue a rule prohibiting the export of crude oil produced in the United 
States, except that he may exempt from the prohibition crude oil exports that he determines to be consistent with the 
national interest and with statutory policies regarding the availability of domestic supplies. 
79 P.L. 99-440. This act prohibited exports of crude oil and refined petroleum products to South Africa, and the 
prohibition was lifted by Executive Order 12769, which was allowed under the act.  
80 See, e.g., Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 492-93 (1904)(“The power to regulate commerce with foreign nations 
is expressly conferred upon Congress, and being an enumerated power is complete in itself, acknowledging no 
limitations other than those prescribed in the Constitution. Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 353-356; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 
U.S. 100, 108.”); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 n.13 (1979) (citing Buttfield for the 
proposition that Congress’s power over foreign commerce is “exclusive and absolute”); California Bankers Ass’n v. 
Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). 
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and plenary.”81 In the seminal 1824 Commerce Clause case Gibbons v. Ogden, the Supreme Court 
said the words of the Commerce Clause “comprehend every species of commercial intercourse 
between the United States and foreign nations. No sort of trade can be carried on between this 
country and any other, to which this power does not extend.”82 As of 2006, the Supreme Court 
had “never struck down an act of Congress as exceeding its powers to regulate foreign 
commerce.”83 
In addition, although there is no precedent that directly addresses Congress’s power to legislate 
pipeline border crossings, language found in multiple judicial opinions further suggests that the 
executive authority to regulate such facilities may be amended by legislation. As noted above in 
Sierra Club v. Clinton,84 the plaintiff challenged the Secretary of State’s 2009 decision to issue a 
permit authorizing a pipeline from Canada to Wisconsin. The reviewing federal district court 
found that the authority to issue permits for these border-crossing facilities “does not derive from 
a delegation of congressional authority ... but rather from the President’s constitutional authority 
over foreign affairs and his authority as Commander in Chief.”85 In reaching its conclusion, the 
court noted that “despite the fact that cross-border permits for pipelines have been issued by 
Presidents in the past, Congress has not attempted to exercise any exclusive authority over the 
permitting process. Congress’s inaction suggests that Congress has accepted the authority of the 
President to issue cross-border permits.”86 This seems to suggest a recognition by the court that 
the cross-border permitting process is not the exclusive province of the executive branch and that 
Congress may legislate in this area if it is so inclined. 
Similarly, in Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate v. U.S. Department of State,87 the reviewing federal district 
court engaged in a discussion of the nature of the authority being exercised by the President in 
granting cross-border permits. The court noted that 
In this case, the proposed pipeline crosses international borders. Under the federal 
Constitution, then, the authority to regulate such a project vests in either the legislative or 
executive branch of government. Congress has failed to create a federal regulatory scheme 
for the construction of oil pipelines, and has delegated this authority to the states. Therefore, 
the President has the sole authority to allow oil pipeline border crossings under his inherent 
constitutional authority to conduct foreign affairs.88 
As with the Attorney General opinions discussed above, the court’s language suggests that 
Congress possesses the constitutional authority to legislate border crossing facilities, which 
suggests that Congress also can legislate to amend the role of the executive branch with respect to 
such facilities.  
                                                 
81 Board of Trustees of University of Illinois v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 56 (1933). The Court stated that “[a]s an 
exclusive power, its exercise may not be limited, qualified or impeded to any extent by state action.” Id. at 56-57. The 
Court also stated that “[i]n international relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade the people of the 
United States act through a single government with unified and adequate national power.” Id. at 59. 
82 22 U.S. 1, 193-94 (1824). 
83 United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1343 (2007). 
84 689 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (D. Minn. 2010). This case is discussed in greater detail above at p. 5-6.  
85 Id. at 1162. 
86 Id. at 1163. 
87 659 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D. S.D. 2009). 
88 Id. at 1081 (emphasis added). 
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Summary 
As the discussion above demonstrates, all three branches of the federal government have 
historically taken an expansive view of the nature of Congress’s authority to regulate foreign 
commerce, even in the absence of existing legislation in the area. Although the Temporary Payroll 
Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011 appears to be the first legislation enacted on the subject of 
cross border pipeline permitting, the absence of previous legislation related to the permitting of 
cross border facilities does not mean that Congress lacks the constitutional authority to take 
action on these matters. 
The executive branch also possesses some ability to act in the area of border crossing permitting, 
derived from the power to conduct foreign affairs under Article II of the Constitution. The 
executive’s ability to act in this area, however, is informed by the previous lack of federal 
legislation in this area. The absence of legislation up to this point may have “enable[d], if not 
invite[d], measures on independent presidential responsibility” in which the President has acted in 
the “absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority.”89 However, if Congress chose 
to assert its authority in the area of border crossing facilities, this would likely be considered 
within its constitutionally enumerated authority to regulate foreign commerce.90 Congress may 
consider legislation to overturn the domestic effect of legal action denying a permit for a border 
crossing facility for the Keystone XL pipeline. It could also potentially establish criteria for the 
issuance of any cross border permits, and potentially require the issuance of permits to entities 
which fulfill such criteria. 
Constitutional Concerns Related to Potential Action 
by States 
As noted earlier, the federal government’s role in siting the Keystone XL pipeline limited to the 
border crossing facility, although its environmental review considered impacts of the entire 
project pursuant to NEPA. However, some state and local government officials voiced concern 
regarding the pipeline’s proposed route through areas perceived to present safety or 
environmental issues. At least one state, Nebraska, took action in November 2011, adopting two 
laws that (1) carve out a role for the state in siting “major oil pipelines” that run through the 
state,91 and (2) directing collaboration with the State Department on a supplemental 
environmental statement for the proposed pipeline.92 
Debate over the legislation in Nebraska gave rise to two constitutional concerns that some feel 
may limit the extent to which states may legislate and regulate interstate oil pipelines generally, 
and the proposed Keystone XL pipeline in particular. First, some have expressed concern that a 
                                                 
89 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J. concurring). 
90 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (“Due respect for the decisions of a coordinate branch of 
Government demands that we invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress exceeded 
its constitutional bounds.”). 
91 Neb. Laws LB1 (November 22, 2011), available at http://nebraskalegislature.gov/FloorDocs/Current/PDF/Final/
LB1_S1.pdf. 
92 Neb. Laws. LB4 (November 22, 2011), available at http://nebraskalegislature.gov/FloorDocs/Current/PDF/Final/
LB4_S1.pdf. 
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state action may place too great of a burden on interstate commerce, in violation of a doctrine 
known as the dormant Commerce Clause. Second, some have wondered whether state legislation 
or regulation of interstate pipelines is preempted by federal legislation related to interstate 
pipeline safety.  
The Dormant Commerce Clause 
Legal Background 
The Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce with foreign 
nations and among the various states.93 This power has been cited as the constitutional basis for a 
significant portion of the laws passed by Congress over the last 50 years, and it currently 
represents one of the broadest bases for the exercise of congressional authority. Although the 
Constitution does not explicitly provide that this federal power displaces the power of states to 
regulate interstate commerce, the courts have long found that such restrictions are an inherent part 
of the federal authority.94  
State interference with trade was widespread before the ratification of the Constitution and a 
source of much dispute, so one goal of granting Congress the power to regulate interstate 
commerce was to limit such practices.95 It was not clear at first to what extent states retained 
authority over such commerce. However, the doctrine of a dormant Commerce Clause was soon 
recognized by the courts as a limit on state legislation, even in the absence of congressional 
regulation.96 Dormant is used to describe this right because it is not an express provision in the 
Constitution. 
Although the meaning and application of the dormant Commerce Clause has varied over time, the 
modern standard, as applied to state regulatory actions, contains two basic inquiries. First is the 
question of whether a state regulation discriminates against other states on its face or in effect, 
showing an intent to benefit in-state economic interests at the expense of out-of-state interests. If 
that is the case, then no further analysis is required,97 and the law will generally be struck down.98 
Second, if a law is non-discriminatory, but still has some impact on interstate commerce, the court 
will evaluate the law using a balancing test to find whether there is a legitimate public purpose.99 
                                                 
93 U.S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3. 
94 See generally, Johnny Killian, George Costello & Kenneth Thomas, Constitution of the United States of America: 
Analysis and Interpretation 223-227 (2002).  
95 Id. at 221-222. 
96 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Wilson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829); 
Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). 
97 “When a state statute clearly discriminates against interstate commerce, it will be struck down ... unless the 
discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism.” Wyoming v. 
Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)). See 
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (upholding state ban on importation of out-of-state baitfish based on possible 
presence of parasites and nonnative species in baitfish shipments).  
98 Discriminatory laws motivated by “simple economic protectionism” are subject to a “virtually per se rule of 
invalidity,” City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin, 
340 U.S. 349 (1951), Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm., 432 U.S. 333 (1977), which can only be 
overcome by a showing that the State has no other means to advance a legitimate local purpose. Maine v. Taylor, 477 
U.S. 131 (1986). See also Brown-Forman Distillers v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986). 
99 The most commonly cited case for this balancing test is Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc, 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
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State public health, environment and safety concerns are generally considered by the courts to 
represent a legitimate public purpose.  
State Authority for Energy Facility Siting 
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that land use regulation, such as zoning, has 
traditionally been considered primarily a state concern. Also, there are many instances of states 
taking an important role in regulating the siting of energy facilities and associated rights-of-way. 
This includes state statutes governing the siting of oil pipelines within their borders.100 In 
addition, siting electricity transmission lines has also historically been the exclusive province of 
states regardless of the nature of the facilities and the degree to which the interstate electricity 
grid depends upon those facilities. States retain primary authority to make siting decisions even in 
areas considered particularly important to the interstate electricity grid.101 Other federal 
legislation has recognized the state’s role in making siting decisions with respect to other tools of 
interstate commerce like wireless telecommunications facilities102 and interstate highways.103 
Of course, federal legislation may reduce the primacy of state authority. For instance, federal law 
provides that siting decisions for interstate natural gas pipelines are made by FERC pursuant to 
Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act.104 Further, interstate natural gas pipelines still must obey state 
and local laws, including zoning ordinances, unless preempted by federal law. Thus, there seems 
to be little question that both historical practice and modern regulatory schemes recognize a 
significant role for state regulatory actions regarding siting energy facilities and associated rights-
of-way. 
Application of the Dormant Commerce Clause to State Action Related to 
Oil Pipeline Siting 
In order to make a dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the court must have a fully developed 
record to allow “a sensitive, case-by-case analysis of purposes and effects.”105 Such a record is 
lacking in the Keystone XL case thus far. Without knowing what final action states may take, it is 
difficult to speculate which, if any, of those potential actions might present dormant Commerce 
Clause concerns. It is possible, however, to outline the factors a court might consider in reviewing 
a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to state action related to the pipeline. 
The first question that a court would consider in a dormant Commerce Clause challenge would be 
whether a particular state regulation or siting decision was discriminatory. So long as the 
                                                 
100 See, e.g., S.D. Codified Laws §49-41B-4.1 (requiring a state permit and the approval of the state legislature prior to 
construction of a “trans-state” transmission facility, defined to include pipelines). To CRS’s knowledge, no such statute 
has ever been the subject of a legal challenge based on the dormant Commerce Clause. 
101 Energy Policy Act of 2005, P.L. 109-58, at §1221. 
102 Section 704(a) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (47 U.S.C. §332(c)(7)) allows state and local governments to 
make decisions regarding the siting of wireless communications facilities, subject to certain limitations, such as 
mandating that the local decision must not “prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless 
services.” 
103 Under the Federal Aid Highway Act (23 U.S.C. §101 et seq.), siting decisions for interstate highways are made 
solely by the states. 
104 15 U.S.C. §717f(c). 
105 W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 201 (1994). 
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regulatory scheme provided a uniform standard for reviewing siting decisions for energy 
transmission it seems unlikely it would be found unconstitutional due to discrimination. In order 
to be found discriminatory, it would need to be shown that the intent or effect of the legislation 
was to benefit in-state economic interests at the expense of out-of-state interests. For instance, 
protectionist legislation which favored in-state companies regarding right-of-way acquisition 
might run afoul of this requirement. However, to the extent that the law applies equally to both in-
state and out-of-state pipeline companies, it is not clear that there would be a basis for an 
argument that such a law was discriminatory.106  
If a law, statute or siting decision was found not to be discriminatory, then a court would move to 
a Pike analysis, in which an excessive burden on interstate commerce must be shown. One court 
described the Pike analysis as putting the burden on the challenging party to show that a statute 
encumbers interstate commerce in a way that “is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits.”107 Although lower courts have varied in their application of this test,108 it does appear 
that states are given significant deference by courts to establish environmental, public health, and 
safety standards. 
Some have posited that a court might apply a heightened level of scrutiny to any state action 
regarding the Keystone XL pipeline on the grounds that the action would regulate “foreign 
commerce.” The Supreme Court has held that state action which burdens foreign commerce 
should be subjected to a “more rigorous and searching scrutiny.”109 However, this heightened 
level of scrutiny has generally been applied to those areas where the state action directly affects 
foreign trade or foreign entities, not where it burdens commerce generally. Accordingly, it is 
unlikely that any state action related to the siting of the Keystone XL pipeline within its borders 
would be seen as a direct regulation of foreign trade. Rather, the action would most likely be seen 
as dictating the terms and conditions of the domestic transit of an imported good after it has been 
imported. 
Next, putative local benefits would be identified and weighed. It does not appear to be difficult to 
establish before a court that an oil pipeline siting statute would serve local interests. As discussed 
above, courts have considered safety and economic concerns in evaluating similar legislation, and 
a court might also consider environmental, aesthetic, or any number of other non-protectionist 
concerns.110 The relative weight of the local benefits would depend not only on the benefits 
identified by a court, but also on what implementing regulations look like and how a regulatory 
scheme is applied in a particular case.  
Once a court had established what legitimate state interest was being served, it would then 
evaluate the level of burden on interstate commerce that was imposed by the state regulatory 
                                                 
106 For example, an argument has been made that legislation that impacts only pipes in excess of a certain diameter, as 
has been proposed in draft legislation in Nebraska, might only affect interstate pipelines. If the law does not 
discriminate between in-state and out-of-state ownership, control, or other economic impacts of these pipelines, this 
distinction alone would not be grounds for a finding of discriminatory state action in violation of the dormant 
Commerce Clause.  
107 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981) , quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
108 See James D. Fox, State Benefits Under the Pike Balancing Test of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1 Ave Maria L. 
Rev. 175 (20030. 
109 South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 100 (1984). 
110 Note that the existence of a legitimate state interest would not override an express federal preemption of state 
authority. This topic will be treated later in this report. 
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activity. In general, it appears unlikely that the passage of an oil siting statute similar to laws in 
other states would by itself create an “undue burden on interstate commerce” that would dictate 
reversal of the law. Statutes that require state permission prior to construction and operation and 
conformity with siting and regulatory requirements as set forth by a state agency during the 
review process are not uncommon and appear to be challenged only rarely.111  
A state action related to the siting of an oil pipeline could be found to impose a significant burden 
on commerce. For example, if the statute requires the owner/operator of a proposed pipeline to 
obtain a permit before siting a pipeline in the state, but the regulatory agency tasked with 
enforcing the statute refused to permit a proposed pipeline across the state regardless of location, 
that refusal arguably may constitute an undue burden on interstate commerce.112 However, even 
that decision might not be a per se violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, as a court might 
choose to evaluate the burden imposed by the re-routing of the pipeline through other states, or 
the burden imposed by using an alternative means of transport of the oil.  
Assuming that a state statute or regulatory scheme would not preclude the passage of the 
Keystone XL pipeline through the state, it may still impose some administrative burden, and, in 
addition, might delay project construction or make the project more expensive. The burden on 
commerce is measured by the level of burden, delay, and expense. A court would consider what 
costs could be associated with this delay, and how this would affect the overall viability of the 
project. As noted, however, the fact that there are costs associated with regulatory burdens does 
not appear to have led to significant challenges to oil pipeline siting statutes in the past. 
One argument that could be made is that new state requirements for oil pipelines in the Keystone 
XL pipeline planning process where none previously existed could add significantly to the cost or 
viability of the pipeline. Establishing the economic effect of a delay would depend on factors that 
could not be easily established until legislation was passed and siting decisions were made. For 
instance, what changes to the Keystone XL planning process would be required because of a 
change in siting to the original proposal? What costs associated with the pipeline have already 
been expended, and would the value of those expenditures be diminished by failure to begin 
construction by a certain date? What financial commitments might expire, and what would be the 
costs of new ones? How might delay otherwise raise costs, and would the economic viability of 
the project be threatened? What other economic or business considerations would be involved? 
One could argue further that a court would need to consider how changed regulations might affect 
the burden on commerce. Thus, to the extent that the Keystone XL Pipeline planning process had 
accounted for certain regulatory hurdles, the state action might not significantly add to those 
regulatory burdens. However, new regulations could mean additional processing. To the extent 
that a court found that delays, even if costly, were a necessary component of the state effectuating 
legitimate state interests in public health and safety, then a court would be likely to find that the 
state’s action was not an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. 
                                                 
111 But see Lakehead Pipeline Company v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 696 N.E.2d 345 (Ill. App. 3rd Dist. 1998). 
112 Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad Corp., v. South Dakota, 236 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1018 (S.D.S.D. 2002)(finding 
dormant Commerce Clause violation because administrative burdens imposed on a pipeline project would prevent the 
pipeline from being built).  
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Federal Preemption of State Pipeline Legislation 
Background 
Before turning to whether and how a state statute might be preempted, it is useful to review the 
history and content of federal pipeline safety legislation. The initial federal legislation governing 
fossil fuel pipeline safety was the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968.113 This pipeline safety 
legislation was amended in 1979 to include liquid fuels,114 and has been since been amended on a 
number of occasions, including by the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002.115 Thus, what is 
often referred to as the “Pipeline Safety Act” is actually several statutes enacted over the last fifty 
years and codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 60101 et seq. However, for the sake of convenience this 
memorandum will refer to the collection of federal legislation codified at 49 U.S.C. Chapters 
601-605 as the “Pipeline Safety Act.” 
How Preemption Is Evaluated 
In addition to the arguments that state action regulating interstate pipelines might run afoul of the 
dormant Commerce Clause, several parties have also voiced concerns as to whether certain state 
actions related to oil pipelines could be preempted by the federal Pipeline Safety Act. Under the 
Supremacy Clause,116 statutes and treaties as well as the constitution itself supersede state laws 
that “interfere with, or are contrary to” their dictates.117 In such cases, the federal law is said to 
“preempt” the state law. In evaluating Supremacy Clause challenges to state statutes or other state 
actions, courts will generally consider three ways that a state action might be preempted. First, 
when acting within its constitutional limits, Congress may expressly preempt state law.118 Second, 
federal law may preempt state law if the two conflict.119 This type of conflict occurs either when 
“compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility”120 or if the state 
law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.”121 And third, “Congressional intent to preempt state law in a particular 
area may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to 
make reasonable the inference that Congress ‘left no room’ for supplementary state regulation.”122  
The preemption argument in the case of Keystone XL is based on a concern that potential state 
action affecting pipeline siting might be preempted by federal pipeline safety statutes, despite 
state intent to protect public safety and the environment. 
                                                 
113 P.L. 90-481. 
114 P.L. 96-129. 
115 P.L. 107-355. 
116 U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2. 
117 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824). See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 
(1819). 
118 California Federal Savings and Loan v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987), citing Jones v Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 
519, 525 (1977). 
119 Id. at 281. 
120 Id., quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 (1963). 
121 Id., quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
122 Id. at 280-281, quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
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Express Preemption of State Action Related to the 
Proposed Keystone XL Pipeline 
Turning first to express preemption, the Pipeline Safety Act contains the following language: 
A State authority that has submitted a current certification under section 60105(a) of this title 
may adopt additional or more stringent safety standards for intrastate pipeline facilities and 
intrastate pipeline transportation only if those standards are compatible with the minimum 
standards proscribed under this chapter. A state authority may not adopt or continue in force 
safety standards for interstate pipeline facilities or interstate pipeline transportation.123 
In order to determine what state action is expressly preempted, it must first be determined what is 
meant by “safety standards for interstate pipeline facilities or interstate pipeline transportation.” It 
is difficult to draw specific parameters as to what sort of state action would constitute a “safety 
standard for interstate pipelines facilities or interstate pipeline transportation” and therefore 
would be an area in which any state action would be expressly preempted by the Pipeline Safety 
Act. There are at least five sources for guidance on the parameters of the Pipeline Safety Act’s 
express preemption: related statutory provisions, the “plain meaning” of the statutory language, 
the “industry usage” of the language, the federal agency’s exercise of the statutory authority 
granted to it, and interpretations of the language by the federal courts.  
Related Statutory Provisions 
The Pipeline Safety Act offers an express statement of federal preemption, but also includes a 
limitation on the federal exercise of authority pursuant to the act: “[t]his chapter does not 
authorize the Secretary of Transportation to prescribe the location or routing of a pipeline 
facility.”124 This suggests that so long as the state action can be deemed only to “prescribe the 
location or routing of a pipeline facility,” there would likely be no federal preemption.  
The difficulty for proposed state actions affecting interstate pipelines arises where decisions 
related to location and routing may impact matters related to safety. This analysis should provide 
guidance to the state in determining what action can be taken without crossing the line from a 
legitimate state action affecting location/routing to a state adoption of “safety standards” that 
would be preempted by the Pipeline Safety Act. 
Before moving forward with this analysis of what action may avoid being deemed preempted, it 
is important to note that the Pipeline Safety Act’s preemption provision prohibits states from 
adopting safety standards for both “interstate pipeline facilities” and for “interstate pipeline 
transportation.”125 It is not clear what sort of state action might be preempted by a prohibition on 
safety standards for “pipeline facilities” and “pipeline transportation,” but it is important that a 
state be aware of the existence of this prohibition and note that a court would likely seek to 
address this language in any preemption challenge based on 49 U.S.C. Section 60104(c).  
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124 49 U.S.C. §60104(e) 
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The Plain Meaning of the Preemption Clause Related to Safety Standards 
The primary rule of statutory interpretation is that, in the absence of a statutory definition (as is 
the case here), words in statutes are to be given their “plain meaning,” and the plain meaning of 
“safety standards” is generally understood to be explicit rules regarding levels of safety that must 
be attained.  
It is unclear whether the plain meaning or ordinary usage of the phrase “safety standards” would 
extend beyond pipeline performance standards to action taken by a state with respect to the siting 
of pipelines- an authority that is expressly not preempted by the Pipeline Safety Act- that is done 
for the express purpose of protecting public safety.126 If however the state action related to siting 
were made for reasons not related to safety, a “plain meaning” reading of the statute would still 
suggest that there would be no preemption.  
Industry Usage of the Phrase “Safety Standards” 
A second rule of statutory interpretation is that some words or phrases may be ascribed the 
meaning given to them in the field addressed by the statute. The industry’s perception of what 
concepts are (and are not) considered aspects of pipeline “safety” is therefore instructive here. 
One such example are the “safety and government-cited standards” for “pipeline operations” 
published by the American Petroleum Institute (API).127 Of those standards and 
recommendations, only “managing system integrity” seems to relate to the pipeline’s location, 
and, on initial review, those standards seem to be concerned only with different standards and 
practices that may apply in certain “high consequence” areas, rather than planning or routing 
concerns.  
The API also has “safety and fire prevention” standards which seem to contemplate emergency 
prevention and response rather than external safety issues.128 These industry-sourced standards 
may suggest that the industry considers “safety standards” to include only standards that impact 
pipeline operations such as avoiding leaks, preparedness and early warning systems, integrity 
testing, and related concepts, rather than standards to be contemplated during the planning/routing 
process. 
PHMSA’s “Safety Standards” Promulgated Pursuant to the Pipeline Safety Act 
Another helpful tool in interpreting the meaning of the phrase “safety standards for interstate 
pipeline facilities or interstate pipeline transportation” is the extent to which the federal 
regulatory agency tasked with implementing those standards has asserted its authority. The 
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) is a division of the U.S. 
Department of Transportation tasked with, among other things, the promulgation and enforcement 
of regulations issued pursuant to the terms of the Pipeline Safety Act. These regulations can be 
                                                 
126 Presumably safety concerns often are a factor in pipeline siting. 
127 The standards are referred to as “government-cited” because the Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety 
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Proposed Keystone XL Pipeline: Legal Issues 
 
Congressional Research Service 20 
found at 49 C.F.R. Parts 190-195. The regulations are helpful in interpreting the Pipeline Safety 
Act because they offer insight into the PHMSA’s perception of its authority under the act. 
Multiple substantive matters are addressed in PHMSA’s pipeline safety regulations, which are 
issued pursuant to its authority under the Pipeline Safety Act.129 These requirements all appear to 
relate to the physical properties of the pipeline and associated facilities, the qualifications of the 
personnel employed in the construction, operation and maintenance of the pipelines, or 
emergency response requirements.  
The regulations seem to recognize the different safety and environmental hazards presented by 
the siting of pipelines in different locations. For example, the regulations appear to establish 
varying standards for pipelines in rural areas, “unusually sensitive areas,” and other geographical 
distinctions. It appears that these distinctions are made in order to establish different physical, 
emergency response and other requirements rather than to dictate a policy of siting pipelines 
away from these areas. State actors that infringe on this assertion of federal jurisdiction could be 
preempted by federal statute. 
Thus, it appears that the PHMSA seems to view the extent of its authority over “safety standards 
for interstate pipeline facilities or interstate pipeline transportation” to extend to subjects such as 
the physical makeup up the pipeline, monitoring requirements, personnel qualifications, 
emergency response requirements, and related topics. If this is the extent of the reach of the 
Pipeline Safety Act’s jurisdiction with respect to oil pipelines, state action would avoid 
preemption so long as it does not affect these aspects of oil pipeline operation. 
Federal Jurisprudence Challenging State Action as Preempted by the 
Pipeline Safety Act 
Finally, jurisprudence in the federal courts can assist in understanding the parameters of the 
federal authority to adopt “safety standards for interstate pipeline facilities or interstate pipeline 
transportation” and the express limitation on the states to adopt such standards. Although there is 
no case law evaluating a challenge to a state statute or regulatory action governing the location of 
an interstate pipeline, these cases help to draw the line between a permissible state activity 
governing pipeline activities and an impermissible foray into interstate pipeline safety standards 
expressly preempted by the Pipeline Safety Act. 
In Texas Midstream Gas Services v. City of Grand Prairie,130 a natural gas pipeline operator 
sought to enjoin the Grand Prairie City Council from enacting and enforcing a city ordinance 
known as “Section 10,” requiring a special permit from the city in order to build a natural gas 
compressor station, and mandating that compressor stations comply with certain setback 
requirements, security requirements, aesthetic and noise level requirements.131 Parties were also 
required to pave means of vehicular access to the facilities in order to obtain a permit.132 In this 
instance, the pipeline operator had announced its intentions to build and operate the facility prior 
                                                 
129 See 49 C.F.R. parts 190–195. 
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131 Id. at 203. 
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to the enactment of Section 10 by the Grand Prairie City Council.133 The pipeline operator 
claimed, among other things, that Section 10 was preempted by the Pipeline Safety Act. After a 
federal district court held that only that portion of Section 10 requiring a security fence was 
preempted by the Pipeline Safety Act and rejected the request for injunction regarding 
enforcement of the remainder of Section 10, the pipeline operator appealed to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court affirmed the lower court’s decision and rejected the 
request for an injunction, thus allowing the city to enforce Section 10 with the exception of the 
security fence requirement.134 
With respect to the setback requirement, the court noted that 
The question is whether the setback requirement is a “safety standard.” It is not. Along with 
the other provisions of Section 10, the setback requirement primarily ensures that bulky, 
unsightly, noisy compressor stations do not mar neighborhood aesthetics. City Council 
records reveal that Grand Prairie’s primary motivation in adopting Section 10 was to 
preserve neighborhood visual cohesion, avoiding eyesores or diminished property values.135 
The pipeline company claimed that, regardless of the purpose of the enactment, Section 10 had 
the effect of regulating fire safety, and thus was preempted by the Pipeline Safety Act.136 The 
court rejected this argument, finding that “[a] local rule may incidentally affect safety, so long as 
the affect is not ‘direct and substantial.’”137 The court also addressed the scope of the PSHMA 
regulations as discussed above. In response to an assertion by the pipeline that Section 10 was 
preempted because the PHMSA regulations “address the location of compressor stations,” the 
court clarified that “the PSA itself only preempts safety standards,” and that the regulation cited 
by the pipeline “touches on compressor station location only as a means of effectuating this 
legislative directive. A regulation promulgated by an administrative agency cannot expand the 
unambiguously expressed preemptive scope set by Congress.”138 This decision helps illustrate the 
type of state or local actions related to pipeline facilities that the courts have held to be preempted 
by the Pipeline Safety Act’s assertion of exclusive federal jurisdiction over “safety standards” for 
interstate pipeline facilities so long as the state or local action does not have “safety standards” 
for the pipeline as its primary intent.  
Another U.S. Court of Appeals decision, Kinley v. Iowa Utilities Board,139 illustrates the sort of 
state or local action that the courts have found would be preempted by the Pipeline Safety Act. In 
Kinley, the owner/operator of an interstate petroleum product pipeline challenged an Iowa state 
statute that established a “comprehensive state program supervising the intrastate and interstate 
transportation of solid, liquid or gaseous substances ... in order to protect the safety and welfare of 
the public.”140 The state statute, referred to as “Chapter 479” required that such facilities be 
permitted by the state.141 The pipeline owner/operator challenged the state’s assertion of 
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jurisdiction over the operations of its interstate pipeline as preempted by the Pipeline Safety Act. 
After the district court agreed with the owner that the state’s assertion of jurisdiction over 
interstate pipelines under Chapter 479 was preempted, the state appealed to the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. On appeal, the state acknowledged that certain aspects of Chapter 479 that 
explicitly dealt with safety were preempted by the Pipeline Safety Act. However, the state argued 
that there were certain “non-safety” provisions of Chapter 479, specifically hearing, permit and 
inspection provisions as well as financial responsibility requirements designed to protect the 
state’s farmland and topsoil from damage due to the construction, operation and maintenance of 
the pipelines and to guarantee payment of property and environmental damages, that were not 
preempted.142 The court disagreed, finding that the hearing, permit and inspection provisions of 
Chapter 479 are “so related to the federal safety regulations that they are preempted” by the 
Pipeline Safety Act, and further holding that “environmental and damage remedies provisions are 
not severable from the preempted hearing, permit and inspection provisions and thus are 
preempted as well.”143 The court thus affirmed the lower court’s opinion and disallowed the 
application of Chapter 479 to the interstate pipeline.144  
The example of Kinley is instructive to states seeking to regulate interstate pipelines. A state that 
is contemplating such action might analyze Iowa’s Chapter 479 to avoid creating law that would, 
like Iowa’s Chapter 479, be preempted by the Pipeline Safety Act. It should, however, be noted 
that with respect to the “environmental and damage remedies” provisions, the court found that 
these provisions were preempted by the Pipeline Safety Act not by virtue of their content but 
rather because they could not be severed from other aspects of Chapter 479. As the court noted in 
Kinley, the question of severability is not a constitutional question but instead is a matter of state 
law.145  
Many states have statutes and regulations that govern interstate pipelines subject to the Pipeline 
Safety Act that appear not to have been deemed preempted by the Pipeline Safety Act. Although 
the lack of a successful preemption challenge does not conclusively demonstrate that the state 
statute would survive such a challenge, a state might nevertheless find that such statutes and 
regulations provide guidance in avoiding preemption.  
Conflict Preemption of State Action Related to the 
Proposed Keystone XL Pipeline 
If the state action is not expressly preempted, it may be preempted by what is commonly known 
as “conflict preemption.” There appear to be two arguments that action regarding the siting of the 
proposed Keystone XL pipeline would be preempted by conflict with federal law and would 
therefore be unconstitutional. The first is that a siting statute would conflict with the president’s 
authority to permit cross-border pipelines. It is difficult to comprehend how a state statute that 
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addresses the location of a facility within its borders would “conflict” with an exercise of 
executive branch authority to authorize cross-border pipelines. There would likely be no 
operational conflict, as compliance with both the federal requirement and a state permitting/siting 
requirement is not only physically possible but has been achieved by numerous other 
international pipeline projects that have obtained presidential permits and also satisfied permitting 
and siting requirements of other states.146 It is also not clear whether and how a state 
permitting/siting requirement would “stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Although the State Department considered the 
environmental impacts of the entire Keystone XL project when conducting its NEPA review, the 
State Department’s actual permitting authority extends only to that portion of the facility that 
crosses the U.S.-Canada border. According to its own terms, the purpose of the exercise of 
executive authority found in Executive Order 13337 is 
to expedite reviews of permits as necessary to accelerate the completion of energy 
production and transmission projects, and to provide a systematic method for evaluating and 
permitting the construction and maintenance of certain border crossings for land 
transportation .... that do not require the construction and maintenance of facilities 
connecting the United States with a foreign country, while maintaining safety, public health, 
and environmental protections.147 
Viewed in isolation, some of this language could be interpreted to suggest a generic federal 
“purpose and objective” of accelerating completion of energy production and transmission 
projects, in which case state legislation which might impede the completion of such projects 
could be considered to be in conflict with the stated federal purpose. However, this appears likely 
to be too narrow a view of the objective of Executive Order 13337, which appears intended to 
expedite the processing of presidential permit applications. It therefore seems unlikely that a court 
would construe state action impacting the siting of an oil pipeline within the state’s borders as “an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives” of the federal 
government as expressed in Executive Order 13337.  
A second potential claim of “conflict preemption” would be an assertion that state action conflicts 
with the Pipeline Safety Act. It is impossible to draw a conclusion without knowing the nature of 
the state’s action. Additionally, it is difficult to articulate an argument that a state statute related to 
oil pipeline siting would present either an “operational conflict” with the Pipeline Safety Act or 
would be deemed “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives” of the Pipeline Safety Act, which are stated as “to provide adequate protection against 
risks to life and property posted by pipeline transportation and pipeline facilities by improving the 
regulatory and enforcement authority of the Secretary of Transportation.”148 So long as state 
action did not interfere with the accomplishment and execution of these objectives by the federal 
government and did not make it impossible for an entity to comply with its actions, the Pipeline 
Safety Act, and any regulations issued pursuant to the act, a court would likely not find that the 
state’s action was invalidated by “conflict preemption” with the Pipeline Safety Act. 
                                                 
146 See, e.g., the “Alberta Clipper” pipeline project, the border-crossing of which was authorized by the U.S. 
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Field Preemption of State Action Related to the 
Proposed Keystone XL Pipeline 
The third and final potential preemption of state action is what is commonly known as “field 
preemption”; that is, where it is inferred from congressional action that Congress intended to 
remove a state’s regulatory authority over an entire subject. However, the Supreme Court has held 
that 
When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has included in the enacted 
legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when that provision provides a 
“reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority,” “there is no need to 
infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions” of the 
legislation.149 
Because Congress explicitly addressed the issue of preemption in the Pipeline Safety Act at 49 
U.S.C. Section 60104, there is no need to explore the notion of “field preemption” with respect to 
that legislation. 
Judicial Review of the NEPA Process for Permitting 
Under Executive Order 13337 
The State Department reviews environmental impacts prior to making the national interest 
determination. However, the legal necessity of the State Department’s review under NEPA for 
projects under Executive Order 13337 is uncertain. Compliance with NEPA in this instance could 
mean a project once immune from judicial oversight is subject to court review. 
Executive Order 13337 
As discussed above, Executive Order 13337 delegates the President’s authority to the State 
Department to issue permits for certain energy projects that cross international borders. Executive 
Order 13337 requires that the State Department seek the views of certain Agency heads, including 
the Secretary of the Interior and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, prior 
to issuing the determination.150 While the introductory language of the order indicates one 
purpose of the process is to maintain “environmental protections,” the order does not explicitly 
require consideration of environmental impacts. It states only that the permit be in the national 
interest. Executive Order 13337 is a modification of Executive Order No. 11423, which predates 
NEPA,151 and thus, does not reference a NEPA review to inform the national interest 
determination.  
                                                 
149 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc, 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992), quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp, 435 U.S.497, 505 
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150 Exec. Order No. 13337 §1(b). 69 Fed. Reg. 25299 (May 5, 2004). 
151 Executive Order No. 11423 was issued in 1968 (33 Fed. Reg. 11741 (August 20, 1968)), whereas NEPA was 
enacted on January 1, 1970. 
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Keystone XL NEPA Background 
For the Keystone XL project, an environmental impact statement (EIS) was prepared under 
NEPA.152 On January 28, 2009, the Department of State announced receipt of the application and 
its intent to conduct a NEPA review: 
With respect to the application submitted by Keystone, the Department of State has 
concluded that the issuance of the Presidential permit would constitute a major Federal 
action that may have a significant impact upon the environment within the meaning of the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969. For this reason, Department of State 
intends to prepare an EIS to address reasonably foreseeable impacts from the proposed action 
and alternatives.153 
State Department NEPA Regulations 
The State Department’s announcement was consistent with its regulations. Under 22 C.F.R. 
Section 161.7(c), the State Department will prepare an environmental assessment154 for certain 
projects, including issuing permits for construction of international pipelines as provided under 
Executive Order 11423.155 
Pursuant to its regulations, the State Department evaluates the environmental impacts under 
NEPA prior to making a national interest determination for a permit. For example, it prepared an 
environmental assessment for an oil pipeline that crossed from Alberta, Canada, to Superior, 
Wisconsin.156 It also prepared an EIS for the earlier Keystone oil pipeline from Canada.157  
Judicial Review 
Courts have considered whether any environmental review prepared by the State Department for 
projects seeking a permit under Executive Order 13337 is subject to judicial review. Only trial-
level courts have heard the issue, and the decisions in those courts have been split. The U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia held that there was no judicial review of Executive 
Order 13337 actions.158 A year later, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, which 
was not bound by that precedent, held that a State Department NEPA review prepared for a permit 
under Executive Order 13337 was a final agency action subject to review by a court. 
                                                 
152 See Keystone XL report for details on the Keystone NEPA process. 
153 74 Fed. Reg. 5019, 5020 (January 28, 2009). 
154 Under NEPA, an environmental assessment (EA) is a review to see whether an agency action might result in 
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In order to sue the federal government, the government must waive of sovereign immunity. For 
federal agency actions, that waiver is typically provided by the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA): “Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no 
other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.”159 Courts have consistently held 
that an EIS is a final agency action subject to review under the APA. However, under accepted 
precedent, no NEPA review is required for actions by a President because NEPA applies to 
“agencies of the Federal government,”160 and not to presidential actions.161 Thus, although it 
seems no NEPA review was required under Executive Order 13337, the State Department’s NEPA 
review may be an agency action that is judicially reviewable. By conducting a NEPA review, the 
State Department may have opened that evaluation to court scrutiny. 
District Court Holdings Related to Executive Order 13337 
District courts disagree over whether an EIS would be an agency action under these 
circumstances. The district court of D.C. held that it is not, relying on the fact that the Executive 
Order is a delegation by the President of a constitutional authority.162 The court in that case 
focused on the issuance of the permit and not on the EIS, itself. Since the delegation did not 
change the underlying authority for the action, just who issues the permit, according to the D.C. 
district court, any activity by the State Department pursuant to that Executive Order is a 
presidential action, and not an agency action.163  
The U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota disagreed with the reasoning of the D.C. 
district court and found that an EIS by the State Department for a cross-border pipeline permit 
was reviewable.164 The court noted the State Department’s Federal Register notice in which it 
stated that the pipeline permit was a “major federal action.”165 The court noted that although the 
permit pertained to a pipeline crossing an international border, that did not excuse the State 
Department from analyzing the environmental impacts of the entire route. More important, the 
court held that the fact that the permit for the international crossing was a presidential action did 
not “convert the State Department’s preparation of the FEIS into a presidential action.”166 
To some extent, the two courts are arguing about two different things: the issuance of the permit, 
and the issuance of the EIS. However, only the District of Minnesota separates the two actions, 
noting that the issuance of the permit was not before the court,167 and allowing judicial review of 
the EIS. Further, evidence appears to support the notion that an EIS is an agency action separate 
from the State Department’s issuance of a presidential permit under Executive Order 13337. First, 
the State Department, under APA notice and comment rulemaking created a rule stating it would 
                                                 
159 5 U.S.C. §704. 
160 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C). 
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prepare an EA for pipelines under that Executive Order.168 If the State Department failed to 
complete a NEPA review while that rule was still in effect,169 it could be liable under the APA for 
acting contrary to its own regulations. Second, there is no directive in the Executive Order to 
perform any type of environmental review. A permit could be issued without any NEPA review, 
but occurs because of a State Department regulation requiring an EA, consistent with NEPA. 
Thus the NEPA review could be characterized as a congressional delegation of authority by 
statute (NEPA) rather than a presidential delegation of authority via Executive Order 13337. 
Additionally, the State Department’s description of its process indicates that the national interest 
determination is separate from the NEPA review, lending further support to the argument that 
there are two actions: “Following the release of the Final EIS, a review period begins to 
determine if the proposed project is in the national interest. This broader evaluation of the 
application extends beyond environmental impact, taking into account economic, energy security, 
foreign policy, and other relevant issues.”170 
In reaching its conclusion that issuing a permit under Executive Order 13337 is judicially 
untouchable, the D.C. district court reviewed Supreme Court precedent and noted that no decision 
is directly on point.171 The Supreme Court has considered presidential actions only in the context 
of those authorized by statute.172 In those cases, Franklin v. Massachusetts173 and Dalton v. 
Specter,174 the Court reviewed challenges to the sufficiency of agency or commission reports 
submitted to the President before he acted. The decisions of the President in each case were held 
to be insulated from judicial review because, regardless of the documents’ content, the Court held 
the President had ultimate discretion. The reports submitted to the President as part of each 
underlying statutory directive did not change the nature of the authority: regardless of the content 
of the reports, the decision was still made by the President. In the case of Franklin, the statute did 
not require the President to use the data in the report.175 In Dalton, the Court held that despite the 
statute’s requirement limiting the President to approving or rejecting the list in its entirety, the 
ultimate authority was still presidential: no action was final until the President submitted his 
certificate of approval to congress.176 
Distinctions between the Supreme Court cases and an EIS for Executive Order 13337 may be 
made. In those court cases, the documents given to the President were required by an underlying 
                                                 
168 See 45 Fed. Reg. 59553 (September 10, 1980). 
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173 Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992). This case challenged the Secretary of Commerce census report 
methodology as authorized under 13 U.S.C. §141. The Supreme Court described the process as having three parts. 
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statute and deemed part of the delegated authority. In cases under Executive Order 13337, there is 
no presidential directive suggesting or requiring an environmental review. The EIS was a 
discretionary action of the agency based on a statutory requirement that agencies act “to the 
fullest extent possible” to review agency actions.177 To make that distinction more clear, if a 
Secretary submitted a “view” under Executive Order 13337 Section 1(b)(2) stating it was not in 
the national interest to issue the permit, but the State Department issued the permit anyway, under 
Supreme Court precedent neither the “view” nor the permit issuance appears to be reviewable. 
Under the holdings in Franklin and Dalton, that “view” would not be final and the permit 
issuance would be part of the delegated presidential authority because the “view” was advisory 
and part of the delegated presidential authority. In contrast, if the EIS finding was in error, well-
established case law would allow challenge of the EIS as “arbitrary and capricious” under the 
APA.178 While that might not change the State Department’s determination of the project’s being 
in the national interest, it would make the EIS a final agency action reviewable under accepted 
legal precedent. 
Second, the reports in Franklin and Dalton were found not to be final actions because the 
presidential decision still had to be made. Whereas, courts have held repeatedly that a completed 
EIS is a final action.179 In fact, in Franklin, the Court noted the ways that the census report was 
not an APA agency action: it was “not promulgated to the public in the Federal Register, no 
official administrative record is generated, and its effect on reapportionment is felt only after the 
President makes the necessary calculations and reports the results to Congress.”180 In contrast, 
each of those factors occurs for an Executive Order 13337 NEPA review: it was promulgated to 
the public, there is an administrative record, and under Supreme Court precedent, injury under 
NEPA occurs when the agency fails to comply with the law.181 Because the State Department 
prepared a supplemental EIS to address EPA’s concerns with the draft EIS, the State Department 
appears to concede that its EIS was different from the documents at issue in Franklin and Dalton.  
The Franklin Court said that until the President acted there was “no determinate agency action to 
challenge, since the President, not the Secretary, takes the final action that affects the States.”182 
In the case of Keystone XL, while issuing a permit is a final action taken under presidential 
authority, the EIS may also be a final action, which is taken under separate statutory authority. 
The D.C. court’s holding did not recognize that distinction. Instead, the D.C. court found that the 
permit was a presidential action not subject to judicial review. Minnesota found that the EIS was 
a final agency action subject to judicial review. 
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